a concept for the onboard architecture of autonomous spacecraft, the Standard Generic Approach to Spacecraft Autonomy and Automation (SGASAA), cf. Pidgeon et al., 1992 , Grant, 1994 .
The SGASAA autonomous functionalities comprise (1) a plan hierarchy with a master plan providing high-level goals for the whole mission (2) plan-instantiation faculties (that should include goal-oriented planning, as described by Grant, 1994] ) (3) fault diagnosis and recovery. SGASAA spacecraft would be able to operate 'independent' of ground control, i.e. continue the execution of the mission in accordance with the master plan without ground intervention.
In the paper a di erent conception of autonomy is developed based on the 'classical' distinction in Distributed Arti cial Intelligence (DAI) between Distributed Problem Solvers (DPS) and MultiAgent Systems (MAS) (cf. Bond & Gasser, 1988] ). The major di erence between DPS and MAS appears to be (1) in DPS the problem space is pre-de ned, the only problem being the distribu-1 tion of computing entities to optimize e ciency while in MAS di erent agents may have di erent problem spaces or world views and (2) MAS agents have individual endogenous goal structures ( Castelfranchi, 1994 ] calls this 'motivational-or goal autonomy') that may allow for cooperation and negotiation but also prevent assimilation of goals from others (Castelfranchi calls this 'executive autonomy'), i.e. the ontogenesis of the goal-structure is not unconditionally modifyable by other agents.
Autonomous agents try to pursue their own goals in the real world, which has as a consequence that they must consider changes in the world during the realization of the goals. Checking whether there is progression toward goals is called re ection about planning. Switching to other, more urgent (or more 'committed' cf. Dongha, 1994]) goals, if necessary is called re ection about planning.
Re ective properties seem to be the second necessary condition for autonomy as is discussed in the paper.
This newly developed conception of autonomy is formalized on the basis of the representational framework developed by Werner, 1989] . He distinguishes three components in the representational state of an agent: a belief, an intentional and an evaluative component. In the paper we argue that the change in the intentional state should be made dependent on the change in evaluation value of the new goal. A formal account of this is given in the paper.
The de nition of autonomy as developed by us has important consequences for autonomous spacecraft. The most important consequence is that besides functioning in the absence of ground control they may not execute ground control commands after testing them. The most important justi cation for this functionality is that it overrides inappropriate or faulty commands. This is further elaborated in the paper. 
